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The parties negotiating the marriage would come to an agreement upon the major
issues before the promises of marriage were exchanged. In our modem society the
couples are more apt to fend for themselves. There must necessarily be a period
of discussion and agreement concerning the more serious questions of their future
life as husband and wife. A discussion of these questions prior to the engagement
would be highly presumptive. It is the engagement which permits the parties to
come to agreement upon the issues which will largely determine the success of their
future marriage. The engagement then, is not a contract, but rather a relationship
or status which the parties enter by giving a conditional promise of marriage; the
condition is that the parties still wish to marry at the end of the engagement.
By permitting the action of breach of promise, the law treats a conditional
promise as binding. In so doing it destroys the social function of the engagement,
which is to permit the parties to change their minds. The California legislature,
recognizing that the existence of the action for breach of promise of marriage was
not in the public interest, abolished it. The decision in Langley v. Schumacker,
by narrowly construing the legislative intent, permits the legislative purpose to be
frustrated by simply alleging that the promise of marriage was made without
intent to perform. The threat of an embarrassing lawsuit is apt to cause a party
who has not made a promise of marriage to settle out of court, and the party who
has made such a promise may be induced to go through with the marriage even
though the engagement has cast some doubt as to its probable success.
The legislative intent in abolishing actions for breach of promise of marriage
should not be construed as abolishing only actions based upon breach of contract,
for the statute which abolished the action abolished three other torts as well,
i.e. alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction. The legislature
has placed the action of breach of promise within a classification of torts to be
abolished, because the action is tortious as well as contractual. 29 The legislature
apparently intended to remove the evil resulting from suits for breach of promise
regardless of the form of action the evil chose to take. The statute states that
no cause of action arises for breach of promise of marriage. The statute as con-
strued by the Supreme Court of California succeeds in abolishing only one form
of the action.
Allan B. O'Connor
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: LEVY OF EXECUTION FOR ACCRUED ALIMONY AND
CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
In granting a divorce, California trial courts are empowered under the pro-
visions of California Civil Code section 1391 to make orders for permanent ali-
mony and child support. When the payments so ordered become overdue, one
29 See note 20 supra.
1 CALrF. CIv. CODE § 139. In any interlocutory or final decree of divorce or in any final
judgment or decree in an action for separate maintenance, the court may compel the party
against whom the decree or judgment is granted to make such suitable allowance for support
and maintenance of the other party for his or her life, or for such shorter period as the court
may deem just, having regard for the circumstances of the respective parties and also to make
suitable allowance for the support, maintenance and education of the children of said marriage
during their minority, and said decree or judgment may be enforced by the court by execution
or by such order or orders as in its discretion it may from time to time deem necessary.
That portion of the decree or judgment making any such allowance or allowances, and the
order or orders of the court to enforce the same may be modified or revoked at any time at
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remedy available to the judgment creditor is a writ of execution which may be
levied against the assets of the judgment debtor.2 Messenger v. Messenger,3 de-
cided by the California Supreme Court in 1956, clearly indicates that trial courts
now have a wider discretionary power over the issuance of a writ than has here-
tofore existed.
On January 8, 1951 the wife in the Messenger case was granted an interlocu-
tory decree which approved and incorporated a property settlement agreement of
the parties. This agreement contained provisions relating both to the division of
community property and to the husband's support obligation to the wife. The final
decree was entered on January 16, 1952. Thereafter, in December 1953, the plain-
tiff wife applied for an order of execution for claimed arrearages of $6,700 and
secured an order to show cause why the defendant husband should not be held in
contempt for failure to make the overdue payments. The husband then obtained
an order to show cause why the payments should not be reduced. As to this reduc-
tion, the court held that the paymenets could not be modified, because the pro-
vision for support was an integrated part of the property settlement agreement.
California Civil Code section 139 deals only with modification of alimony and
child support orders; it does not authorize modification of property awards. Thus,
since the provision for wife support was an inseparable part of the agreement con-
cerning the division of property, the necessary result was that no part of the
agreement could be modified.
Bearing upon the issue of whether execution should be granted, the husband
presented evidence that he had been twice married since the divorce, that his only
income was from his medical practice, and that he had suffered a partial stroke.
The trial court concluded that execution should not issue on the grounds that the
defendant had no property or monies against which such execution could be suc-
cessfully levied and that the only way to serve execution would be by placing the
constable in charge of daily receipts, which would discredit the defendant, a pro-
fessional man, and thereby impair his ability to pay alimony. Arrearages were
ordered to be paid in installments and issuance of execution was suspended so long
as defendant paid the installments, but in event of default, an execution was to
issue forthwith.
In affirming this order, the California Supreme Court said that California Civil
Code section 139, as amended in 1951, now provides it's own means of enforce-
ment. The relevant added provision states that orders
"may be enforced by the court by execution or by such order or orders as in its dis-
cretion may from time to time deem necessary." 4
In respect to this addition the Supreme Court declared:
"Under this provision the trial court now has discretion to determine in each case
whether execution is an appropriate remedy for enforcing its order. In the present
case the court found on sufficient evidence that to permit the issuance and enforcement
the discretion of the court except as to any amount that may have accrued prior to the order
of modification or revocation.
Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party in any
decree, judgment or order for the support and maintenance of the other party shall terminate
upon the death of the obligor or upon the remarriage of the other party.
2Van Cleave v. Bucher, 79 Cal. 600, 21 Pac. 954 (1889).
3 46 Cal.2d. ...... 297 P.2d 988 (1956).
4 See note I supra.
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of a writ of execution would discredit defendant professionally and impair his ability
to make the monthly payments and discharge the arrearages. Accordingly, it did not
abuse its discretion in conditioning the issuance of execution .... 5 (Emphasis added.)
This opinion seems to indicate that the trial court for the first time may exer-
cise discretion in the issuance of execution. This is not precisely true, for as will
presently be seen, trial courts have for some time exercised a limited discretionary
power over issuance of the writ. In order to understand the scope of this power, it
would be well to consider the distinction between California Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 6816 and California Code of Civil Procedure section 685,J the two
sections which previously defined the requirements necessary in order that execu-
tion be granted pursuant to orders for alimony and child support made under
California Civil Code section 139.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 681 states that "The party in whose
favor judgment is given may, at any time within five years after entry thereof,
have a writ.... ", and that any period during which the judgment or order is stayed
or enjoined will be excluded from the computation of the time. Under this section,
it is not necessary that the judgment debtor be given notice when application is
made to the court for a writ.8 In order to avoid confusion when the cases under this
section are discussed, it should be noted that the date of entry for an installment
payment was construed to be the date that such installment became due.9 Thus,
if a final decree of divorce had been granted in 1930, in 1950 the judgment creditor
could have made application under California Code of Civil Procedure section 681
for installments becoming due between 1945 and 1950.
California Code of Civil Procedure section 685 provides for the reviving of
dormant judgments and states in part:
In all cases the judgment may be enforced or carried into execution after the lapse of
five years from the date of its entry, by leave of the court, upon motion, and after due
notice to the judgment debtor accompanied by an affidavit or affidavits setting forth
the reasons for failure to proceed in compliance with the provisions of section 681 of
this code. The failure to set forth such reasons as shall, in the discretion of the court,
be sufficient, shall be ground for the denial of the motion.1 0
646 Cal.2d at ........ ,298 P.2d at 994.
6 CALI. CODE CIv. PROC. § 681 (1933). The party in whose favor judgment is given may,
at any time within five years after the entry thereof, have a writ of execution issue for its
enforcement. If, after the entry of the judgment, the issuing of execution thereon is stayed or
enjoined by any judgment or order of court, or by operation of law, the time during which it is
so stayed or enjoined must be excluded from the computation of the five years within which
execution may issue. (The 1955 amendment increases the time from five to ten years.)
7 CAL . CODE CIV. PROC. § 685 (1933). In all cases the judgment may be enforced or carried
into execution after the lapse of five years from the date of its entry, by leave of the court,
upon motion, and after due notice to the judgment debtor accompanied by an affidavit or
affidavits setting forth the reasons for failure to proceed in compliance with the provisions of
Section 681 of this code. The failure to set forth such reasons as shall, in the discretion of the
court, be sufficient, shall be ground for the denial of the motion.
Judgment in all cases may also be enforced or carried into execution after the lapse of five
years from the date of its entry, by judgment for that purpose founded upon supplemental pro-
ceedings; but nothing in this section shall be construed to revive a judgment for the recovery
of money which shall have been barred by limitation at the time of the passage of this act.
(The 1955 amendment increases the time from five to ten years.)
8 Castle v. Castle, 71 Cal.App.2d 323, 162 P.2d 656 (1945).
9 Gaston v. Gaston, 114 Cal. 542, 46 Pac. 609 (1896) ; Cochrane v. Cochrane, 57 Cal.App.2d
937, 135 P.2d (1943).
10 See note 7 supra.
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The purpose of this section was succinctly stated in Butcher v. Brower:'-
"[lit is clear that the principal object of the new enactment was to place upon a
creditor seeking to enforce a judgment more than five years after its entry, the burden
of showing why he was not able to satisfy his claim within the statutory period during
which he is entitled to an execution as a matter of right.'
12
As can be imagined, the principal inquiry under this section was whether the judg-
ment creditor had used due diligence to seek out and subject the property of the
judgment debtor to execution at the earliest possible moment.13 But even if due
diligence was proved, the judgment debtor could show other circumstances that
might cause a court within its sound discretion to withhold execution. 14 It will be
seen in the ensuing discussion, that despite an unfortunate conflict in the meaning
of words, the courts did exercise their discretion in behalf of the judgment debtor
whenever future circumstances arose which made it obviously unfair for the judg-
ment creditor to take advantage of a right which in good conscience should no
longer exist.
The semantic difficulty arises by proceeding under the theory that "Primarily,
however, it is the ownership of or interest in the judgment ... that authorize a
party to cause a writ of execution to be issued." 5 When this idea is coupled with
the provision of California Civil Code section 139 that the judgment or orders
"may be modified or revoked at any time at the discretion of the court except as
to any amount that may have accrued prior to the order of modification or revo-
cation." 6 (Emphasis added), it seems quite logical that the California Supreme
Court stated in the 1948 case of DiCorpa v. DiCorpo17 that:
"A writ of execution will issue under the foregoing section CCP 681 as a matter of right
upon installments accruing within the five year period on an ex parte application by
the judgment creditor merely showing that such installments remain unpaid."- 8
But the court went on and said,
"Thus, upon proof by plaintiff that installments have accrued within five years, the
burden was upon defendant to establish facts justifying an order recalling the writ."1 9
The court held in this case that the defendant did not sustain the burden by his
assertions that he was in bad health, unable to work, and would become a public
charge if execution were levied.
The court in the DiCorpo case cited its previous decision in Lohman v. Lok-
man.2 In that case the wife having failed to show that she had used due diligence
in seeking out the husband's assets, was denied execution under California Code
of Civil Procedure section 685 for amounts accruing more than five years previous
to the date of application for the writ. But as to the accrual under California Code
of Civil Procedure section 681, it was stated that,
1121 Cal.2d 354, 132 P.2d 205 (1942).
12 Id. at 357, 132 P.2d at 206-07.
13 See note 11 supra.
14 Ibid.
15 19 CAL,. Jur.2d, Executions § 12 (1954).
16 See note 1 supra.
17 33 Cal.2d 195, 200 P.2d 529 (1948).
18 Id. at 201, 200 P.2d at 532.
19 Ibid.
20 29 Cal.2d 144, 173 P.2d 657 (1946).
March, 1957 NOTES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
"Although issuance of execution upon a judgment requiring monthly payments may
be denied upon equitable grounds, proof that the installments have accrued within five
years establishes a prima facie right to execution and the burden is cast upon the judg-
ment debtor to establish facts justifying an order denying the writ. 2 1
In holding that the plaintiff was entitled to execution, the court pointed out that
defendant executrix had not made a denial of indebtedness; that the issue of due
diligence under California Code of Civil Procedure section 685 was not pertinent
in argument under California Code of Civil Procedure section 681. The dissent,
believing the trial court order should have been affirmed, said in part:
"It seems ... to be wholly inconsistent to hold ... that such enforcement could be
denied 'upon equitable grounds'. Enforcement is either a matter of right or a matter
of discretion, but it cannot be both."
2 2
That it could be "both" was explained in Wilkins v. Wilkins,23 which involved
issuance of execution upon an award which had provided both alimony and child
support in a non-segregated amount. The husband had ceased payments when the
last child reached majority in 1943. In 1948, the wife remarried and then sought
execution for the entire amount of accrued payments. In disallowing execution for
the full amount of the original order, the court declared:
"While the creditor is, as a matter of right, entitled to an execution, the affidavit,
order and execution issued thereon are subject to review ... the trial court may exer-
cise its judicial discretion in determining whether the facts set forth in the affidavit
are true, and whether there has been a misrepresentation of the facts or willful sup-
pression of facts which should have been related to the court in the first instance, or
whether the husband was or was not under a legal duty to support the children or wife
during the period in question." 2 4
Dealing with a similar situation, the court was asked in Anderson v. Anderson2
if the decree providing alimony and support of the children, without segregation of
amount, became void when one child reached majority. The court answered:
"The rule is that the court may modify a prior decree prospectively but may not make
a modification operative on payments already accrued. But execution on the latter pay-
ments may not issue as a matter of right. The court has the discretion of determining
under the equities ... whether execution should issue .... ,,26
Colby v. Colby27 presented another situation where the wife's claim to a writ
as a matter of right was denied. The interlocutory decree in 1943 provided for
weekly payments of $42.50 for the wife and two children. In 1945 the wife re-
ceived a lump sum of $742.50 from the husband, agreeing that he would be relieved
of further weekly payments until called upon by the wife. In 1953, the wife at-
tempted to levy execution without having called upon the husband to resume
payments. The writ was quashed. As to the matter of right claimed by the wife,
the court replied:
"[It] does not alter the court's equitable jurisdiction to grant relief against a judg-
ment which has actually been satisfied in toto."28
21 Id. at 150, 173 P.2d at 660.
22 Id. at 157-58, 173 P.2d at 665.
23 95 Cal.App.2d 605, 213 P.2d 748 (1950).
24 Id. at 610, 213 P.2d 751.
25 129 Cal.App.2d 403, 276 P.2d 862 (1955).
26 Id. at 406, 276 P.2d 865.
27 127 Cal.App.2d 602, 274 P.2d 417 (1954).
28 Id. at 605, 274 P.2d at 419.
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The foregoing consideration has dealt primarily with decisions under Califor-
nia Code of Civil Procedure section 681 in order to clarify certain instances where,
despite the idea of execution being a matter of right, it would have been inequita-
ble for the judgment creditor to take advantage of an order which was legally still
valid. The same type of circumstances have been effective on behalf of the judg-
ment debtor under California Code of Civil Procedure section 685 even when the
wife was able to show that she had not been wanting in diligence. Thus, the wife
was not entitled to collect arrearages for child support or alimony because a third
party had provided the support,19 or because the child had reached majority and
the husband had neglected to obtain a modification order.3 0
The decisions recited thus far have not pointed out whether the courts ever
recognized economic hardship of the judgment debtor as a factor which might
prompt the withholding of a writ. Indeed, the DiCorpo case indicated the contrary
by granting execution to the wife in spite of the husband's plea that he was in ill
health, incapable of labor, and possessed of only one asset, his home. This result
seems to be in keeping with previously established views elicited primarily to over-
rule Shields v. Superior Court3 l and Williams v. Goodin.32 These two cases, de-
cided shortly after the 1933 amendment to California Code of Civil Procedure 685,
did recognize hardship as a factor to be considered in the exercise of discretion.
The former case was expressly disapproved in the Lohman case. The dissent in the
Williams case was followed in subsequent decisions.33 This dissent said that the
husband's ill health was not "a legal reason for depriving the judgment creditor
of that which rightfully belonged to him."13 4
Whereas the court in the Shields and Williams opinions may have been think-
ing in terms of laches, both decisions having been rendered under California Code
of Civil Procedure section 685, clearly the result reached in Messenger v. Messen-
ger cannot be attributed to the lapse of time, for only three years passed between
the granting of the interlocutory decree and the application for execution. The
grounds upon which the trial court based its decision suggest two factors of im-
portance: 1) execution if levied would not be successful, and 2) the husband would
be subject to harrassment. Apparently, then, the court must have been influenced
by the relative hardship to plaintiff and defendant.
The additional question might be posed whether extreme economic hardship
to the judgment debtor might alone cause a court to conditionally suspend execu-
tion even though such execution was assured of success. Thus, suppose as in the
DiCorpo case, the husband owned a house but received only a very small income.
If execution was allowed, the husband would possibly become a public charge. But
if execution was suspended upon payment of small installments, and if the original
payment order was prospectively modified, would this not be tantamount in result
to retroactive modification of the original award? Of course this could not have
occurred in the Messenger case because the support provisions were integrated
with the property settlement provisions. But if the support agreement was sever-
29 Parker v. Parker, 203 Cal. 787, 266 Pac. 283 (1928) ; Radonich v. Radonich, 130 Ca.App.
250, 20 P.2d 51 (1933).30 Danz v. Danz, 96 CalApp.2d 709, 216 P.2d 162 (1950) ; Hale v. Hale, 6 Cal.App.2d 661,
45 P.2d 246 (1935).
31.138 CalApp. 151, 31 P.2d 1045 (1934).
32 17 CalApp.2d 62, 61 P.2d 507 (1936).
33 Atkinson v. Atkinson, 35 CalApp.2d 705, 96 P.2d 824 (1939); Passow v. Bell, 27 Cal.
App.2d 360, 81 P.2d 224 (1938) ; McClelland v. Shaw, 23 CalApp.2d 107, 72 P.2d 225 (1937).
3, 17 Cal.App.2d at 67, 61 P.2d at 509, 510.
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